This paper consists in an analysis of two explanatory models of human behaviour which play a prominent role in the contemporary literature on human action. The first model - the causalist - aims at explaining action in terms of causes and general laws. The second model - the intentionalist - explains human action in terms of intentions and practical syllogism. The difficulties of both models are presented and in the last part of the essay we propose one alternative model, based (...) on the notion of retroduction.O trabalho consiste numa análise de dois modelos explicativos do comportamento humano considerados fundamentais na literatura contemporânea sobre teoria da ação. O primeiro modelo, o causalista, tenta explicar as ações em termos de causas e leis gerais. O segundo explica a ação em termos de intenções e silogismos práticos. As dificuldades e problemas de ambos modelos são apresentadas e na última parte do ensaio propomos um modelo alternativo baseado na noção de retrodução. (shrink)

This paper relates intentionality, a central feature of human consciousness, with brain functions controlling adaptive action. Mental intentionality, understood as the “aboutness” of mental states, includes two modalities: semantic intentionality, the attribution of meaning to mental states, and projective intentionality, the projection of conscious content into the world. We claim that both modalities are the evolutionary product of self-organized action, and discuss examples of animal behavior that illustrate some stages of this evolution. The adaptive advantages of self-organized action impacted on (...) brain organization, leading to the formation of mammalian brain circuits that incorporate semantic intentionality in their modus operandi. Following the same line of reasoning, we suggest that projective intentionality could be explained as a result of habituation processes referenced to the dynamical interface of the body with the environment. (shrink)

The paper focuses in philosophical problems concerning the nature of intentionality and mental representation. The first part presents a historical outline of the problem and reviews some classical/contemporary writings on the question. The second part examines the so-called Chinese Room Argument formulated by J. Searle. The third part presents a few arguments aiming to show the inadequacy of the functionalist model for the design of robots. The conclusion points to some alternatives to the traditional functionalist model such as, for instance, (...) the connectionist model.O artigo aborda problemas filosóficos relativos à natureza da intencionalidade e da representação mental. A primeira parte apresenta um breve histórico dos problemas, percorrendo rapidamente alguns episódios da filosofia clássica e da filosofia contemporânea. A segunda parte examina o Chinese Room Argument formulado por J. Searle. A terceira parte desenvolve alguns argumentos visando mostrar a inadequação do modelo funcionalista de mente na construção de robots. A conclusão aponta algumas alternativas ao modelo funcionalista tradicional, como, por exemplo, o conexionismo. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper focuses on two issues approached by transhumanism: immortality and longevity. The first part present some contours of the transhumanist program and its motivation. The second discusses the extent to which the promise of immortality cannot be fulfilled by the idea of uploading the brain on the internet. The third part focuses on longevity. It shows why the transhumanist program for the elderly fails.